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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new rules on
aid to shipbuilding 1 requires the Commission to present to the Council a regular report on the
market situation and assess whether European yards are affected by anti-competitive
practices. Accordingly, the Commission has presented to the Council four previous reports on
the situation in world shipbuilding 2, outlining the serious difficulties the shipbuilding sector is
facing and providing detailed information on the unfair commercial practices of Far East
competitors. This fifth report is in continuity with the approach and the findings of the first four
reports.
The world shipbuilding market continues to face serious difficulties, due to an imbalance of
supply and demand. Past expansion of shipyards, mainly in Korea, but now increasingly also
in China 3, has led to price depression. Thanks to a historically high level of ordering in 2000,
prices recovered to some extent, but the significant drop in orders in 2001 has led to a new
reduction in prices.
The year 2001 has been very problematic for the maritime industries world-wide: The
recession in the US and the terrorist attacks of 11 September have decreased the demand for
sea trade and cruises, respectively. The decline in ordering affected the sectors of
containerships and cruiseships most, leading to a drop in overall market share for Korea and
the EU which are particularly strong in these segments.
Only the segment of Liquified Natural Gas carriers (LNG) saw an increase in absolute order
volume. However, this is still a niche market. Korean yards took most of the orders for LNG
carriers. They hold 65 % of the relevant world orderbook, and 79 % of the new orders placed
in 2001 went to Korean yards, despite the fact that Korea is a relative newcomer in the field
and the building yards do not hold patents on the key technologies. Market analysis suggests
that Korean yards made inroads in this area due to very low offer prices. Their ability to
supply a large number of vessels at an early delivery date may have been important in getting
a large amount of orders also.
The detailed cost investigations undertaken by the Commission show that certain Korean
yards continue to price ships below cost while others are trying to improve their bottom line.
Most major Korean yards managed to show a profit for 2001, thanks to the high sales
volumes and the related advance payments received, although in some instances, certain one-
off measures aimed to improve the yards’ financial situation also played a role.
Despite various rounds of talks with Korea, the Commission did not manage to convince
Korean authorities and yards to fully implement market principles and allow a shake-out of
non-viable companies. An improvement in the market situation is therefore not likely and
consequently the Commission has proposed measures to the Council, namely the preparation
                                                
1 OJ L 202 of 18.7.1998, p. 1.
2 COM(1999) 474 final of 13.10.1999, COM(2000) 263 final of 3.5.2000, COM(2000) 730 final of
15.11.2000, COM(2001) 219 final of 2.5.2001. These reports are available on internet (in English only):
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/maritime/shipbuilding_market/index.htm.
3 Most of the larger Chinese yards are currently undertaking significant investment projects for new or
extended dry docks and for additional crane capacity which will boost their output and productivity (see
for example Lloyd’s List of 5 and 14 February 2002).
4of a request to the WTO for dispute settlement and a Regulation concerning a temporary
defensive mechanism to shipbuilding.
The present report confirms the findings from the previous four Commission reports, i.e. that
the world shipbuilding market is characterised by a strong imbalance of supply and demand,
that over-expansion of shipbuilding capacity in Korea has led to very low offer prices in most
market segments and that the resulting losses for Korean yards, in some cases, have been
compensated through financial restructuring which, in the view of the Commission, is not in
line with applicable WTO rules. The Commission will continue its market monitoring and
cost investigations and report its findings to the Council as foreseen in Article 12 of
Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
1. INTRODUCTION
Article 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1540/98 of 29 June 1998 establishing new
rules on aid to shipbuilding 4 requires the Commission to present to the Council a
regular report on the market situation and assess whether European yards are affected
by anti-competitive practices. Accordingly, the Commission has presented to the
Council four previous reports on the situation in world shipbuilding 5, outlining the
serious difficulties the shipbuilding sector is facing and providing detailed information
on the unfair commercial practices of Far East competitors. This fifth report is in
continuity with the approach of the first four reports. Therefore this report should be
seen in conjunction with key elements of the earlier reports, in particular regarding
– the longer term supply and demand analysis for merchant ships;
– general remarks on the nature of shipbuilding contracts and on the underlying
study work;
– the analysis of the financial sector in South Korea;
– details of certain investigated shipyards;
– the description of the applied methodology;
– the analysis of the shipbuilding industry in the People's Republic of China; and
– the historical background of aid to EU shipyards.
Nevertheless, the information contained in the first four reports is updated in the
present report as appropriate, and essential elements are repeated where necessary.
This concerns in particular the detailed cost investigations for shipbuilding orders
awarded to Asian yards as the underlying cost model is re-run whenever new or better
information is obtained. Cost investigations which have been reviewed are marked in
the reference table.
This fifth report follows the structure used in the fourth report and updates information
on market shares and price developments. Moreover, six new cost investigations for
                                                
4 OJ L 202 of 18.7.1998, p. 1.
5 COM(1999) 474 final of 13.10.1999, COM(2000) 263 final of 3.5.2000, COM(2000) 730 final of
15.11.2000, COM(2001) 219 final of 2.5.2001
5specific orders placed in South Korean yards have been undertaken since the last report
and the results are presented in this report.
The Commission’s shipbuilding reports have been used to support political initiatives
with the objective to find solutions to the persistent problems in the sector. Whilst the
imbalance of demand and supply in world shipbuilding has been an issue for many
years, hard evidence of resulting unfair trading practices has been difficult to provide
due to the nature of shipbuilding contracts (see the related chapter in the first report
COM(1999) 474 final) and the economic globalisation which is a typical feature of the
maritime industries. Traditional trade policy instruments such as custom tariffs and
quotas are not applicable here, leaving policy makers with a very limited set of
options. Therefore direct or indirect state support has for a long time been the
instrument of choice. As the Commission is convinced that state aid is in principle
distortive and does not necessarily help the industry to improve its competitiveness, the
Commission has pursued a policy aiming at the reduction of state aid in the sector.
There is wide consensus in the EU shipbuilding industry that this approach will benefit
EU shipbuilding in the long run.
However, these efforts were seriously undermined when the Asian crisis of 1997/1998
allowed shipyards in South Korea to radically lower prices and win significant market
shares in important market segments, to the detriment of EU competitors. While in
general the competitive advantages from the ensuing Won devaluation had to be
recognised, it turned out that the significantly lower newbuilding prices did not recover
when the Won started to appreciate again. Furthermore, the costs stemming from the
high level of foreign-currency denominated debt of Korean shipbuilders (which were
needed in order to finance the massive expansion of Korean yards in the early 90’s)
appeared not to be included in their cost calculations. The resulting losses led to
serious problems in South Korean yards. Nevertheless, all Korean yards (including
those which had to seek court protection) continued to produce ships and offer them in
the world market at very low prices.
The resulting market distortions became so apparent that the Commission decided to
award a study in order to establish basic facts, such as the actual cost base in Korea and
the impact of the policies of the Korean Government with regard to shipbuilding. The
shipbuilding market monitoring study, now in its third year, has provided a wealth of
data on market developments and the underlying industrial policies. The study deals
with shipbuilding in the Far East in general, but due to the market developments most
activities have focussed on Korean shipbuilding. The shipbuilding market monitoring
study underpins this report and the previous four.
Based on the findings provided in the first four Commission reports, the Commission
tried, up to May 2001, to engage South Korea in talks with the aim to stabilise the
world shipbuilding market through market instruments. These efforts took place on a
bi-lateral level and in the OECD. However, despite a number of negotiation rounds, no
progress was achieved, as the Korean Government claimed that it had no influence on
the shipyards and the financial institutions supporting them, and it was convinced that
business was conducted along free market principles.
6Based on a complaint by the EU shipbuilding industry under the Trade Barrier
Regulation (TBR) 6 the Commission undertook a detailed investigation of Korean
trading practices in shipbuilding. The investigation concluded that “substantial
subsidies have been granted to Korean shipyards through both export and domestic
programmes which contravene the WTO’s 1994 subsidies agreement” 7. The
investigation also concluded that “there is evidence that the subsidies have caused
adverse effects to EU industry within the meaning of the WTO Subsidies Agreement
and are, therefore, actionable” 8.
Consequently the Commission decided to follow a two-pronged approach in order to
address the problem 9. On the one hand it would immediately pursue the matter with
the Korean authorities in order to obtain the immediate withdrawal of the subsidies
or the removal of the adverse effects. Unless a solution was achieved amicably by
30 June 2001, the Commission would proceed with the initiation of a procedure
within the framework of the WTO (which it has not done so far). At the same time
the Commission would propose a temporary support mechanism, which would be
introduced in parallel with the initiation of the WTO procedure. As several rounds of
talks with the Korean Government did not yield any tangible results the proposal for
a temporary support mechanism was made and submitted to the Council 10.
The Industry Council of 5 December 2001 did not reach a decision on the
Commission proposal and it was decided to continue the discussion during the
Spanish Presidency which has expressed its intention to conclude the matter during
its tenure. The EU shipbuilding industry in the meantime requested an extension of
the investigative period for the TBR investigation, in order to cover the market
developments in the period December 2000 to December 2001 as well. The
investigation is on-going.
This present fifth shipbuilding report describes the recent developments in the world
shipbuilding market as required in Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1540/98.
                                                
6 Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 laying down Community procedures in the
field of the common commercial policy in order to ensure the exercise of the Community's rights under
international trade rules, in particular those established under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization, Official Journal L 349, 31.12.1994, p. 0071-0078.
7 Press release IP/01/656, 8.5.2001.
8 Press Memo 00/176, 8.5.2001.
9 Press release IP/01/656, 8.5.2001.
10 COM(2001) 401 final, 25.7.2001, see also press release IP/01/1078, 25.7.2001. The Commission
proposal foresees to authorise contract related aid of up to 14 % for those shiptypes for which it has
been demonstrated that the EU shipbuilding industry has suffered considerable injury through unfair
Korean trading practices.
72. MARKET ANALYSIS
2.1. Market developments and market shares
The year 2001 was particularly difficult for the world shipbuilding industry. The
surge in new orders recorded in 2000, triggered by very low prices and making 2000
a record year in the history of shipbuilding with new orders reaching the level of
more than 29 Mio. cgt (compensated gross tonnes), proved to be unsustainable. Total
orders were 21 % lower in 2001 compared to 2000 (based on cgt), as market
segments reached saturation and even lower offer prices failed to cause additional
speculative ordering.
This development was further accelerated by the abolition of operating aid in the EU
from 1 January 2001, bringing forward orders to EU yards, the world-wide economic
slump, lowering the demand for transport services and thus depressing freight rates
and consequently newbuilding demand, and the effects of the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001.
While the decline in the world’s major economies mainly affected the liquid bulk and
the container segments, the events of 11 September had a strong impact on the cruise
industry which saw three bankruptcies and a significant drop in bookings. Cruise
operators then took a reluctant stand and consolidated operations (e.g. by pursuing
mergers or departing from certain cruise areas) rather than aiming for further
expansion. Consequently almost no orders for cruise ships were recorded in 2001
(the only orders placed concerned some smaller, specialised ships for Antarctic
cruises where terrorist threats are considered low and customers in general are less
prone to cancellations). On the contrary, some orders for new cruiseships were
postponed and options for additional ships were not exercised.
As a result the maritime industries in general are facing a bearish mood. Although
many shipyards are still well occupied with the orders placed in 2000 (and earlier),
there is an increasing uneasiness about the situation after 2003 when most of the
previous orders will have been completed. This concerns in particular those
companies which have technical constraints (dock size, design capabilities) and
therefore a narrow product focus, which are already highly specialised with regard to
shiptypes built, which cannot count on the creation of new demand, e.g. through
domestic orders or which are not in the position to develop a naval shipbuilding
portfolio as an alternative to merchant shipbuilding. Unfortunately these
characteristics apply to the majority of yards in the EU and in the European
Economic Area.
The delays in the publication of ordering statistics do not allow to give a final
analysis of 2001 yet, but the Commission undertook significant efforts to consolidate
available information and develop it into a longer time series. The result is presented
in the graph below.
8Fig. 1 - Market shares in new orders in percent and based on cgt, all shiptypes,
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Source: Lloyd's Register/Fairplay – European Commission
It can be seen that in 2001 South Korea and the EU saw decreasing market shares
while Japan and China (PRC) managed to increase their respective shares. This can
be explained by the developments described above: Korean yards had very much
focussed on the market for tankers and containerships, and EU yards are strong in the
construction of cruise ships. All these segments were massively affected by the
effects mentioned earlier, and shifts in product focus (South Korean yards turning to
the construction of LNG carriers, EU yards expanding their ferry and Ro/Ro
portfolios) were not at all sufficient to compensate for the overall decline in orders.
Nevertheless South Korea still maintains a market share significantly higher than the
one it had in the year before the Asian crisis. On the other hand Japan saw a surge in
domestic orders and benefited from a weaker Yen compared to the USD, while
China became a prolific builder of product tankers through low offer prices and
improved quality. Nevertheless the situation in all major shipbuilding regions is seen
as problematic as newbuilding prices decline further and profits are very difficult to
achieve (see next chapter). Therefore the bottom line for many yards is to stay in
business and minimise losses as far as possible.
9In order to give an impression about the shipbuilding market in general, the graph
below provides a breakdown of new orders during the last five years by shiptype.
Fig. 2 – Change in distribution of orders based on cgt, 1997-2001
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Four main volume ship types dominate the market: bulk carriers, chemical/oil
products tankers, crude oil tankers and container ships. Together these ship types
accounted for 73 % of the total order intake in 2001 (in cgt). Other market sectors
effectively make up niche markets, the largest of which are the cruise and LNG
sectors. The decline of the cruise sector and growth of the LNG sector are
particularly marked in the above chart.
LNG carriers are the only market segment that saw an absolute increase in ordering
for new ships in 2001. Although LNG carriers represent a niche market in terms of
volume (less than 2 % of the number of ships on order is for LNG carriers; in terms
of cgt the share of LNG carriers is ca. 8 % of the existing order volume), the ships
are highly sophisticated and comparatively expensive, with unit prices of ca.
170 Mio. USD. Key patents for the cargo containment systems are held by European
companies.
Fifty LNG carriers are currently on order world-wide, with 28 more options. The
confirmed orders represent nearly 36 % of the currently existing fleet of LNG
carriers (in number of ships). Korea holds 65 % of these orders (by cgt), with Japan
taking ca. 25 % and the EU 10 %. Of the 30 new orders placed in 2001 (there were
only orders for four ships world-wide in 1998), Korea took an even greater share (by
cgt): 79 %, compared to 14 % for Japan and 7 % for the EU. This means that this
segment which was dominated by Japanese and European yards (mainly in France
and Finland) before the Asian crisis, is now mostly controlled by Korean yards. The
sector has seen tremendous growth in 2001, but prices for LNG carriers have
declined from 190 Mio. US Dollars per ship in 1998 to less than 170 Mio. US
Dollars in 2001 which can hardly be explained by productivity increases or technical
progress alone. Some orders in Korea, placed in late 2000 at the beginning of the
market expansion, were even reported to be priced below 145 Mio. US Dollars. It
appears that Korean shipbuilders see the LNG sector as the next growth area in
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which they try to gain market shares. In particular Daewoo has been very active in
this sector, taking most of the orders placed in Korea. It should be noted that Daewoo
underwent a complete restructuring in 2000, during which the largest part of the
company’s debts were forgiven or converted to equity held by the main creditor, the
Government-controlled Korean Development Bank (KDB).
While there is some reason to believe that the shipment of natural gas will increase in
the future due to environmental concerns and the needs of emerging economies such
as China, it should also be noted that some orders for LNG carriers were related to
the energy crisis in the USA in early 2001 which in the end proved to be of
temporary nature. Furthermore some orders related to Enron Corp. and probably
these may now be reviewed.
2.2. Price developments
The issue of newbuilding contract prices is one of the most non-transparent in the
shipbuilding industry. Neither shipowners nor shipyards are very open when it comes
to reporting prices. This is mainly due to the fact that shipbuilding is about large
individual orders, fostering a close relationship between yard and customer. While
the yard may wish to attract certain customers through competitive pricing (and/or a
particularly high specification), the owner typically does not want to reveal a
favourable purchase as this may lead his customers to ask for equally favourable
terms with regard to charter terms or freight rates. Therefore, reliable pricing
information is difficult to come by.
The source mostly referred to is H. Clarkson Ltd. 11 and its various subsidiaries (in
particular Clarkson Research). While Clarkson is a well recognised company in the
field and their data is also used by international organisations such as the OECD, the
Commission sees a number of problems with regard to the information provided.
Clarkson price information is related to certain standard shiptypes (with a number of
important shiptypes such as Post-Panamax containerships or passenger ships being
absent), not to actual contracts concluded. The complexity of ships ordered in terms
of technical specification, series production and financing terms is not reflected in
the single figure given for each subtype. Finally, Clarkson also acts as a broker
which may influence positively their view on the market.
Indeed, the Commission’s detailed price investigations for specific contracts showed
that in almost all cases the prices reported by Clarkson for a comparable ship were
higher than the ones found through direct investigations. Suezmax tankers may serve
as an example: Clarkson reports the price for a standard Suezmax tanker of
150 000 dwt as 46,5 Mio USD (end 2001) and Fearnleys indicates a price of
48,0 Mio USD, while the Commission’s market monitoring observed several orders
at a price of 43,0 Mio USD, i.e. 7 to 10 % lower than reported by those companies.
Nevertheless, this report continues to present price information as provided by
Clarkson as the most important source, but reserves the right to complement this
information with its own findings.
                                                
11 http://www.clarksons.net/.
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Table 1 - Clarkson Research price data for bulk shiptypes
Price (Mio. USD)
Shiptype
End-1999 End-2000 End-2001
VLCC 300 000 dwt 69,0 76,0 70,0
Suezmax 150 000 dwt 42,5 52,0 46,5
Aframax 110 000 dwt 33,0 41,0 36,0
Tankers
Panamax 68 000 dwt 31,0 35,5 32,0
Capesize 170 000 dwt 35,0 40,0 36,0
Panamax 75 000 dwt 22,0 22,0 20,5
Handymax 51 000 dwt 20,0 20,5 18,5
Bulkers
Handysize 30 000 dwt 15,5 15,0 14,5
Table 2 - Clarkson Research price data for specialised shiptypes
Price (Mio. USD)
Shiptype
End-1999 End-2000 End-2001
LNG carrier 138 000 m3 165,0 172,5 165,0
LPG carrier 78 000 m3 56,0 60,0 60,0
Container 400 TEU 8,5 10,0 8,9
Container 1 100 TEU 17,5 18,0 15,5
Container 3 500 TEU 38,0 41,5 36,0
Ro/Ro 1 200 - 1 300 lm 21,5 20,0 19,0
Ro/Ro 2 300 - 2 500 lm 32,5 33,0 31,0
Tweendecker 15 000 dwt 13,0 13,8 13,8
The information provided by Clarkson Research confirms the general downward
trend in ship prices. This applies to all standard shiptypes and reflects the generally
negative sentiment in the market, despite rising costs stemming from inflation, wage
increases and higher prices for raw materials priced in USD in all major shipbuilding
regions. This trend is equally confirmed through information provided by the
Norwegian company Fearnleys 12, as published by their subsidiary Fearnresearch.
Fearnleys uses a slightly different breakdown of shiptypes with variations in size and
specification. An overview, indicating slightly higher price levels for most of the
major shiptypes, is given below.
                                                
12 http://www.fearnleys.com/.
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Table 3 - Fearnresearch price data for various shiptypes
Price (Mio. USD)
Shiptype
End-2001
VLCC 280 000 dwt 72,0
Suezmax 150 000 dwt 48,0
Aframax 105 000 dwt 37,0
Tankers
Panamax 68 000 dwt n/a
Capesize 170 000 dwt 36,5
Panamax 75 000 dwt 20,0
Handymax 53 000 dwt 18,0
Bulkers
Handysize 30 000 dwt n/a
Gearless 3 500 TEU 37,0
Gearless 2 750 TEU 32,0
Geared 1 700 TEU 22,5
Container
Geared 1 000 TEU 16,0
2.3. Detailed price analysis
Prices in South Korean shipyards, which are considered the price leaders for most
shiptypes 13, are monitored by the Commission on a contract by contract basis to gain
a more accurate picture of developments. This information is used in order to assess
the pricing policies of individual Korean yards and the shiptypes in their portfolio. A
full presentation of this analysis would be too detailed and thus go beyond the scope
of this report.
Price information has been accumulated and price developments are presented below
in the form of an index with the price level of 1987 equalling an index of 100. The
index is based on published information from brokers and other sources and it shows
the long term price trend as analysed by the Commission’s consultant. The index is
continuously updated with the information contained in the monthly monitoring
reports.
                                                
13 Chinese yards can be considered the price leaders for general cargo ships (tweendeckers) and product
tankers with low specification; Japan has recently become very competitive again for standard bulk
carriers (for which it has specialised yards that benefit from serial production) after the recent decline in
the Yen/USD exchange rate. However, for all commercial shiptypes which would be in the range of EU
yards, Korean yards set the prices.
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Fig. 3 - Newbuilding price index (1987=100)
Source: European Commission
The index clearly shows the massive drop in prices following the Asian crisis of
1997/98 and the subsequent efforts to increase prices along the ordering boom in
2000. The (not very pronounced) trend towards better prices stopped in late 2000 and
for the year 2001 the trend was reversed as had to be expected with the number of
incoming orders falling. It is noteworthy that 2001 price levels are only ca. 20 %
higher than they were in 1987, i.e. prices did not keep pace e.g. with inflation.
With very limited ordering expected for 2002, price recovery will be difficult to
achieve, although yards may be inclined to look for orders in those segments that
have been less affected by price erosion. Past experience has, however, shown that
this behaviour does not improve the financial results of yards, but rather leads to
additional price erosion in the targeted sectors, as long as the market is characterised
by over-supply.
The Commission will continue its price monitoring and will, in accordance with
market developments, put increasing emphasis on production in China. Chinese
shipbuilders have expressed their intention to aim for a large scale expansion of
facilities, quoting South Korea as an example to follow. This is likely to lead to
further price decline, unless China herself creates significant additional demand for
ships. With China now being a full WTO member, this issue should be addressed
before more shipbuilding capacity enters the market.
3. DETAILED COST INVESTIGATIONS
3.1. Update of previous investigations
In order to collect the necessary data, the Commission has recourse to consultants
whose ongoing study has defined a cost breakdown model, including all relevant cost
components both of the direct ship production and the shipyard in general. The model
is based on cost elements covering direct costs (materials, labour, equipment, etc.)
and indirect costs (financing of the ship and of the production equipment, overhead,
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insurance, etc.). The calculated building price also includes a 5 % profit margin.
More details of the cost model can be found in Annex I of the first report.
As the study develops, additional information is gathered and used to validate
previous cost investigations. Consequently, the 32 orders placed in Korea covered in
the first four reports have been recalculated and the updated findings are given
below. As already stated in the first report all parameters are based on a prudent
approach to ensure that calculated minimum costs for particular projects will be
difficult to challenge. The updated analysis includes assumptions on inflation. With
orders taken now but executed in the coming two to three years it is considered normal
business practice to assess future costs at the time of building up to delivery.
Since the 4th shipbuilding report the analytical approach has been reviewed in order to
compare investigation results based on the initial method, namely the calculation of
contributions to debt servicing (in USD per cgt) that have to be carried by the
individual shipbuilding project, to results based on “costs” stemming from facility
depreciation. There is no consistent approach to depreciation in Korea, i.e. different
shipyards use different depreciation periods and calculation methods and it is therefore
very difficult to assign those costs to individual shipbuilding projects.
Nevertheless these alternative calculations have provided a clear picture: Yards, such
as Hyundai (HHI), Hanjin (HHIC) and Samsung (SHI), which have not benefited from
large scale debt restructuring and which operate comparatively “old” facilities show
(slightly) higher production costs under the debt-based methodology, while yards, such
as Daewoo (DSME) and Daedong, which benefited from debt reductions and
moratoria but operate comparatively “new” facilities show (slightly) higher production
costs when basing the investigations on the depreciation approach. The two approaches
give very similar results for the other two major Korean yards, Hyundai Mipo and
Samho. Of course, results are also influenced by the financing terms of the individual
projects investigated. Large up-front payments allow the yard to collect interest while
tail-heavy payment terms increase financial costs. On the other hand these payment
terms have no influence on depreciation. Delivery dates for individual orders may also
play a role, if for example debt moratoria have expired by then and the vessel needs to
contribute to the required debt servicing. In summary the differences between the two
approaches are insignificant and do not change the conclusions from the individual
cost investigations.
In the context of the first shipbuilding report nine orders placed at South Korean
shipyards were investigated. In addition to these orders, nine more orders placed in
Korea have been analysed for the second report and seven investigations were added in
the third report. The fourth report covered seven additional orders. The Commission
ensured a balanced selection of shipbuilding contracts while taking into account the
overall objective of the exercise, the relative urgency of the matter, and the availability
of meaningful data for comparison. The Commission is convinced that the information
entered into the analysis is at present the best available and reliable. The following
table summarises the updated findings for the 32 orders placed in Korea. In order to be
consistent with the previous reports and as differences between investigation
methodologies are in general not significant, all results presented are based on the debt
servicing approach.
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Table 4 - Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices
for selected new shipbuilding contracts (update)
Shipyard Shiptype Owner
Contract
price
(Mio.
USD)
Normal
price14
(Mio.
USD)
Loss/gain
as % of
normal
price
Ref. to
ship-
building
report no.
(*) Daedong 35 000 dwt
tanker
Seaarland 21,5 26,0 - 17 % 1
Daedong Panamax
bulker
Sanama 18,5 26,1 - 29 % 1
(*) Daedong 46 000 dwt
chemical tanker
Cogema 24,5 28,1 - 13 % 2
Daedong 2 500 TEU EF Shipping 30,0 31,4 - 4 % 4
(*) Daewoo VLCC Anangel 68,5 73,6 - 7 % 1
(*)/(**) Daewoo Ferry Moby 74,3 89,0 - 17 % 2
(*) Daewoo Panamax
bulker
Chandris 22,5 23,5 - 4 % 2
(*) Daewoo LNG carrier Bergesen 151,1 159,6 - 5 % 3
Daewoo ULCC Majestic
Shipping
85,0 94,0 - 10 % 4
(*) Halla Panamax
bulker
Diana 18,9 31,0 - 39 % 1
(*) Halla 3 500 TEU Detjen 38,0 52,8 - 28 % 1
(*) Halla Capesize bulker Cargocean 32,0 45,8 - 30 % 2
Samho
(ex-Halla)
Aframax tanker Chartworld
Shipping
33,5 41,3 - 19 % 4
(*) HHI 6 800 TEU P&O Nedlloyd 73,5 81,0 - 9 % 1
(*) HHI 5 600 TEU K Line 54,3 59,3 - 8 % 2
(*) HHI LNG carrier Bonny Gas 165,0 182,5 - 10 % 2
(*) HHI 5 500 TEU Yang Ming 56,0 64,6 - 13 % 2
HHI Ferry Stena 70,0 88,4 - 21 % 4
HHI Suezmax tanker Jebsen 43,0 51,5 - 17 % 4
(***) HHI 7 200 TEU Hapag-Lloyd 72,0 81,0 - 11 % 3
HHI Suezmax tanker Athenian Sea
Carriers
43,0 50,8 - 7 % 3
Hyundai
Mipo
Cable layer Ozone 37,3 46,8 - 20 % 1
Hyundai
Mipo
Chemical
tanker
Bottiglieri 24,5 27,3 - 10 % 4
(*) HHIC 6 250 TEU Conti 62,0 66,0 - 6 % 3
(*) HHIC 5 608 TEU Conti 58,0 62,3 - 7 % 3
(*) HHIC 1 200 TEU Rickmers 19,5 21,2 - 8 % 3
Il Heung 3 700 dwt
chemical tanker
Naviera Quimica 10,5 13,0 - 19 % 2
(*) Samsung 5 500 TEU Nordcapital 55,0 71,8 - 23 % 2
(*) Samsung 3 400 TEU CP Offen 36,0 59,9 - 40 % 1
(*) Samsung Ferry Minoan 69,5 95,6 - 27 % 1
Samsung 7 400 TEU OOCL 79,7 94,1 - 15 % 4
Shina Product tanker Fratelli D'Amato 21,7 24,1 - 10 % 3
(*) These orders were recalculated after new information on the debt situation of the companies
or on the specific order was received.
(**) This order was recalculated after the correct contract price was revealed in the owner's
account statement for 2000.
(***) This order was recalculated after the correct contract price was revealed in the press.
                                                
14 The normal price includes the cost elements covering direct costs (material, labour, equipment, etc.) and
indirect costs (financing of the ship and the production equipment, overhead, insurance, etc.). It also
includes a 5% profit margin.
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3.2. New investigations
Since the last shipbuilding report six more orders (all placed in South Korea) were
investigated in detail, in order to establish the actual building costs. The investigated
orders are:
– VLCC, 48 120 cgt, to be built at Samho Heavy Industries;
– LNG carrier (series of 5), 71 850 cgt, to be built at Daewoo Shipbuilding and
Marine Engineering Co. Ltd. (DSME);
– LNG carrier, 69 675 cgt, to be built at Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI);
– LNG carrier (series of 2), 88 500 cgt, to be built at Hyundai Heavy Industries
(HHI);
– Suezmax crude oil tanker (series of 4), 30 800 cgt, to be built at Samho Heavy
Industries;
– 5 762 TEU containership (series of 2), 42 835 cgt, to be built at Samsung
Heavy Industries (SHI);
Table 5 summarises the findings from the new cost investigations.
Table 5 - Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for
selected new ships (new investigations)
Shipyard Shiptype Owner Contract price(Mio. USD)
Normal
price15
(Mio. USD)
Loss/gain as %
of normal price
Samho VLCC Oldendorff 69,5 81,0 - 14,2 %
DSME LNG Exmar 162,0 159,1 + 1,8 %
SHI LNG British Gas 162,5 166,0 - 2,1 %
HHI LNG Golar 162,6 159,3 + 2,1 %
Samho Suezmax tanker Thenmaris 43,0 54,0 - 20,0 %
SHI Containership CP Offen 55,0 59,3 - 7,3 %
While the level of price under-cutting seems to diminish, mainly due to foreign
exchange gains in 2001 which are expected to be eroded by forecasted wage
increases and inflation 16, the investigations confirm certain known business patterns
of Korean yards. As mentioned before the cost investigations and their under-lying
assumptions are constantly reviewed in order to take into account the latest
                                                
15 On the definition of normal price see footnote 14.
16 The Won weakened significantly against the USD in the first half of 2001, moving from a prevailing
level of around 1 130 Won to the USD to a level around 1 300. Annual wage increases are expected to
be around 10 % while inflation is still comparatively high at around 8 % per annum.
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developments in the yards and in the Korean economy. Therefore debt restructuring
and re-financing efforts, as well as more favourable conditions e.g. stemming from
increased cash flow, are recognised and results therefore may look more positive.
However, the Commission concluded in its TBR report that most of these efforts
cannot be considered compatible with WTO rules and Korean yards, despite coming
close to covering their operating costs, are causing material injury to EU
shipbuilders. Without recognition of the various measures undertaken in Korea in
order to improve the yards’ financial situation the results of the cost investigations
would show a serious gap between full costs and offer prices. Samho, like its
predecessor Halla, continues to price vessels far below building costs, although
losses of up to 40 % of actual building costs as in the past are no longer accepted
since the management of the yard was taken over by Hyundai. Samho also increased
production under the new management, nearly doubling it and focussing mainly on
tankers and thus achieving a better economy of scale. Prices at Samho are now seen
to reflect at least operating costs, although there is still no provision to service or
reduce the company’s debts.
DSME has become the leading builder of LNG carriers in the world, with sixteen
ships on order, giving the yard an economy of scale unseen before. However, the
detailed analysis undertaken revealed that for the construction of LNG carriers there
are limits to the improvement in efficiency as some yard equipment needs to be
duplicated, leading to high up-front investment costs. Furthermore, DSME managed
to start as a new company in late 2000, shedding most of the debts of its predecessor.
Therefore DSME can operate a very large state-of-the-art shipyard without the
massive initial investment costs being reflected in their product prices. Nevertheless
DSME still stands at a debt to equity ratio of 279 % (estimated for 2001), and
although it is currently cash rich due to high order intake in 2001, this is likely to be
dissipated when those orders need to go into production and the actual building costs
begin to be incurred.
SHI remains burdened with a comparatively high level of debt (the debt to equity
ratio for 2001 is estimated to be still more than 200 %) and this fact is reflected in
their cost base. SHI also suffers from a lower productivity than its Korean
competitors, leading to higher wage costs. In addition SHI did not manage to attract
multiple orders as Daewoo and Hyundai did and this has to show in the unit costs.
After being able to dispose of some non-performing assets stemming from HHI’s
previous engagement with other Hyundai subsidiaries, HHI seems now to be heading
towards profitability. HHI’s debt to equity ratio is assumed to reach 183 % in 2001,
but, as with all Korean yards, an assessment of the yard’s financial situation is
difficult to make. Very few meaningful financial figures are given and published
accounts are not very recent and have little or no annotations.
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The world shipbuilding market continues to face serious difficulties, due to an
imbalance of supply and demand. Past expansion of shipyards, mainly in Korea, but
now increasingly also in China, has led to price depression which became
particularly pronounced after the Asian crisis of 1997/98. Although a number of
Korean yards went bankrupt, capacity was not reduced and companies were allowed
to continue their operations. Thanks to a historically high level of ordering in 2000,
prices recovered to some extent, but the significant drop in orders in 2001 has led to
a new reduction in prices.
The year 2001 has been very problematic for the maritime industries world-wide:
The recession in the US and the terrorist attacks of 11 September have decreased the
demand for sea trade and cruises, respectively. Consequently ship owners have been
very reluctant to invest in new tonnage and yards basically live from orders placed
before 2001. The decline in ordering affected the sectors of containerships and
cruiseships most, leading to a drop in overall market shares for Korea and the EU
which are particularly strong in these segments.
Only the segment of LNG carriers saw an increase in absolute order volume.
However, this is still a niche market, representing only ca. 8 % of world orders in
cgt. Korean yards took most of the orders for LNG carriers. They hold 65 % of the
world orderbook for LNG carriers and 79 % of the new orders placed in 2001 went
to Korean yards, despite the fact that Korea is a relative newcomer in the field and
the building yards do not hold patents on the key technologies. Market analysis
suggests that Korean yards made inroads in this area due to very low offer prices, as
has been the case before in certain tanker segments and for containerships. Their
ability to supply a large number of vessels at an early delivery date may have been
important in getting a large amount of orders also.
The detailed cost investigations undertaken by the Commission show that certain
Korean yards continue to price ships below cost while others are trying to improve
their bottom line. Most major Korean yards managed to show a profit for 2001,
thanks to the high sales volumes and the related advance payments received,
although in some instances, certain one-off measures aimed to improve the yards’
financial situation also played a role.
Despite various rounds of talks with Korea, the Commission did not manage to
convince Korean authorities and yards to fully implement market principles and
allow a shake-out of non-viable companies. An improvement in the market situation
is therefore not likely and consequently the Commission has proposed counter-
measures to the Council.
The present report basically confirms the findings from the previous four
Commission reports in relation to the general market situation, the price trends and
the detailed cost investigations. The Commission will continue with its market
monitoring in line with the requirements laid down in Article 12 of Regulation (EC)
No 1540/98.
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